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that demonstrates how demand for housing from seasonal residents affects the welfare of
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certain municipalities to reside on their properties. The policy is shown to increase local
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1 Introduction
A significant share of the housing stock in many developed countries is held as seasonal or va-
cation homes: secondary residences that are used for part of the year by people who primarily
live and work elsewhere. In the United States there are 3.6 million vacation homes, which is
3.1% of the housing stock (US Census Bureau, 2011). In France, secondary homes represent
9.4% of all private residences (INSEE, 2016) and in Switzerland the share is around 5% (Credit
Suisse, 2005). The popularity of vacation homes also varies widely by location. In the United
States, the proportion of vacation homes varies by state from 0.6% in Illinois to 15.6% in Maine.
In Norway, a full 26% of houses are used as vacation homes (Statistics Norway, 2017). Vaca-
tion homes tend to be in sparsely-populated regions that are experiencing poor economic and
population growth. It is therefore important to understand how the presence of vacation homes
affects the economic outcomes for local residents.
Seasonal residents contribute to local economies through the income from property sales and
local spending, which explains why policymakers often seek to attract them. However, seasonal
residents reduce the amount of housing available for local residents while contributing less to
local labour and product markets. Therefore, home ownership by seasonal residents may either
be positive or negative for the local residents and firms. Despite the relevance to regional policy
and active local debates in communities that attract seasonal residents, it is not well understood
how vacation homes affect a regional economy. This paper proposes a theoretical model that
can be used to analyse the impact of vacation homes on regional economies and studies the
effects of a Norwegian policy applied to alleviate their negative effects.
The model I introduce is of a small regional economy with both local and seasonal residents.
In this stylised framework, local residents work in the region and consume local products, while
seasonal residents work elsewhere but occupy housing in the local area. The model predicts that
the presence of seasonal residents generally makes local housing more expensive and reduces
local employment, as the seasonal residents occupy land while contributing less to local housing
and labour markets.
Furthermore, if there are increasing returns to scale in local production, the model predicts
that an increase in demand for housing by seasonal residents can lead to a sharp decline in
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local employment. Increased demand for housing by seasonal residents can even reduce local
employment to such a degree that the total demand for local housing decreases, leading to a
decrease in local house prices. This represents additional harm to local homeowners who are
forced to move away to find work.
In places where vacation homes are popular, concerns often arise that these houses being left
vacant for most of the year can harm the local economy and lead to a decline in local services.
In some cases this may be an illusion, as a decline in local economic activity can lead to lower
house prices that attract vacation-home buyers. However, the model demonstrates that vacation
homes can, in certain circumstances, have detrimental effects on the local economy.
In response to these concerns, some governments have introduced policies that restrict the
use of properties as vacation homes. The Norwegian policy I study in this paper was introduced
in 1974 and it obliges the owner of a property either to reside on it for a majority of the year,
to rent it out, or to sell. Each municipality decides whether to impose this ‘residency require-
ment’. By the end of 2016, 92 of the 428 municipalities in Norway had imposed the residency
requirement for some period of time.
A range of policies have been introduced in other countries to counteract the perceived nega-
tive effects of vacation homes. Denmark has a similar residency requirement to Norway.1 Jersey
and Guernsey restrict the ownership of real estate to people born locally and long-standing res-
idents.2 In France, a higher rate of property tax is imposed on secondary residences and the
rate is elevated further in areas where housing is deemed to be in ‘short supply’, which in-
cludes coastal and mountainous areas popular for second homes (General Directorate of Public
Finances, 2015). Switzerland has restrictions on the construction of new houses in areas with
high shares of second homes (Gerber and Tanner, 2018). These types of policy may not be
politically feasible in countries where the property rights of private owners are stronger. Indeed
it has been argued that the residency requirements in Norway and Denmark are not consistent
1The policy is described (in Danish) on the website of the Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark at
http://naturerhverv.dk/landbrug/arealer-og-ejendomme/landbrugsloven/bopaelspligt/.
2Guernsey classifies housing into Local Market housing, which is restricted to people who have
resided in Guernsey for at least 10 years, and Open Market housing, which anybody may purchase
(described on the website of the States of Guernsey at https://www.gov.gg/populationmanagement). In
Jersey, a resident of at least 10 years can purchase any property, though a limited set of proper-
ties may be purchased by an ’essential employee’ (described on the website of the States of Jersey at
http://www.gov.je/Working/Contributions/RegistrationCards/Pages/ResidentialStatus.aspx).
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with the rules of the European Free Trade Association.3
One feature that distinguishes these policies from more common types of regional policy
is that they require little or no public spending. Most developed countries apply some type of
regional policy, mostly in the form of subsidies or direct spending (OECD, 2010). A prime
example is the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds, which cost around C50 billion annually
and produce only mixed results (Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich, 2010;
Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich, 2012).4 Policies that restrict the ownership or use of land
have the advantage of placing a far smaller burden on public finances, so it is worthwhile to
understand whether they are effective.
The model predicts that the Norwegian residency requirement will lead to a larger local
population and more local employment. Depending on the parameters, the effects on the local
wage and house prices can have either sign as they depend on whether the local businesses
would survive if seasonal residents are allowed to purchase housing.
The empirical analysis shows that the introduction of the residency requirement is associated
with a subsequent increase in the local population and possible increases in employment, wages,
and house prices. A corollary is that the presence of vacation homes has negative effects on the
local population, employment, and wages in the Norwegian municipalities where the policy has
been introduced. However, as the model predicts effects on employment, wages, and house
prices that vary in sign depending on the parameters, it should be noted that the results may
well be different in other parts of the world or for different types of travel.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 presents the data and describes the Norwegian residency requirement in detail. Sec-
tion 4 describes the model for a small regional economy with demand for housing from seasonal
residents. Sections 5 and 5 present theoretical predictions for the effects of seasonal residents
on the local economy and the implications of the residency requirement, which are then tested
using the Norwegian municipality-level data in Section 7. The final section presents concluding
remarks.
3See for example the NRK report “Boplikten kan bli begrenset” (“Residency requirement may be scaled back”)
from June 4th, 2007 and the Nationen article “UmB-professor går hardt ut mot boplikten” (“UmB professor
strongly opposes the residency requirement”) from July 31st, 2012.
4The total budget for the Structural and Cohesion Funds for the 2014-2020 period is C371 billion, with the
annual amount varying between C36 billion and C60 billion (European Commission, 2017).
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2 Literature review
The literature on the local economic effects of vacation homes dates back at least to Wolfe
(1951), who described their role and geographical distribution in Canada. Two decades later,
Ragatz (1970b, 1970a) studied the prevalence of vacation homes in the United States and raised
issues that they could create for housing markets and local services. Subsequent research has
sought to quantify the local effects of vacation homes.
One fundamental question is what effect vacation homes have on local house and land
prices. The model presented in this paper describes situations in which vacation homes have
positive or negative effects on local house prices. The literature has mostly identified positive
effects. Riebsame, Gosnell and Theobald (1996) found that higher demand for second homes
in Colorado had increased house prices in rural areas. Wasson, McLeod, Bastian and Rash-
ford (2013) found similar results for Wyoming, as environmental amenities that are valuable for
visitors but unrelated to agriculture have positive effects on the value of agricultural land. How-
ever, Marjavaara (2007) found that the increased house prices in the Stockholm Archipelago in
Sweden, an area popular for vacation homes, were rather due to permanent homes than vacation
homes. The current paper presents evidence that contrasts with these previous studies, as there
is a weak positive effect of vacation homes on local house prices.
The research into other local economic outcomes also finds largely positive effects. Mar-
couiller, Green, Deller and Sumathi (1996) found a positive contribution of vacation homes
in Wisconsin and Minnesota to local retailers that may exceed the burden on public services.
Curry, Koczberski and Selwood (2001) studied a rural area near Perth in Western Australia
and found divergent outcomes for the various interest groups. Hoogendoorn and Visser (2004;
2011) and Hoogendoorn, Visser and Marais (2009) studied rural towns in South Africa with
substantial numbers of second homes and observed that the spending by part-time residents had
helped these towns to develop and had positive effects on employment growth and property val-
ues. Winkler, Deller and Marcouiller (2015) found that the concentration of vacation homes in
rural US counties correlates with lower economic well-being but higher environmental quality.
A related literature studies the relationship between vacation homes and local public fi-
nances. In terms of public revenue, Fritz (1982) found a positive effect of vacation homes on
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property tax rates in rural Vermont, while Hadsell and Colarusso (2009) found that vacation
homes in New York State were associated with higher property tax rates in villages but lower
property tax rates in larger towns. On the spending side, Anderson (2006) found a positive rela-
tionship between vacation homes and per-capita local public spending in Minnesota, which he
attributed to the lower burden that vacation-home owners place on public services. Combining
revenue and spending, Deller, Marcouiller and Green (1997) found a slight positive contribu-
tion of vacation homes to local government finances in Wisconsin. Johnson and Walsh (2013)
studied the relationship in the opposite direction and found a small negative effect of tax rates
on the number of vacation homes in Michigan, particularly in more rural areas with relatively
elastic housing supply.
The Norwegian residency requirement was studied by Aanesland and Holm (2002) and
Aanesland, Holm and Labugt (2004), who gave a detailed history of the policy and studied its
consequences. They argued that the policy was largely intended to avoid regional areas being
depopulated but that it could lead to greater risk for property owners, as the future value of a
house may be higher if it can be sold as a vacation property. However, in their empirical analysis
they found no significant economic effects of the policy.
The current paper contributes to this literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it presents a
theoretical framework that can be used to analyse the effects of vacation homes on regional
economies. Secondly, the theoretical results explain why the effects differ between regions.
Thirdly, the empirical results demonstrate some implications of vacation homes for regional
areas in Norway and the effects of the residency requirement.
3 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper uses an annual panel of data for Norwegian municipalities
for the period 1974 to 2016. The islands of Jan Mayen and Svalbard are excluded, so the sample
is comprised of the 428 municipalities on the Norwegian mainland.5 Table 1 summarises the
main variables in the dataset, which were all obtained from Statistics Norway.
5Due to mergers and other changes, the set of municipalities in Norway changes over time. The analysis uses
the municipalities that existed in 2016 and maps the data from earlier periods onto these.
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  Number of Number of Standard   
  municipalities observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum 
Population 428 18,404 10,376 29,930 201 662,575 
Number of employees (full-time 
equivalents) 
428 11,556 4,558 14,370 70 305,489 
Mean wage income (NOK) 428 10,272 175,123 65,752 57,200 425,200 
House-price index (detached houses) 328 4,920 12,625 5,704 2,398 51,941 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the population and economic variables in the dataset. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the population and economic variables in the dataset.
As can be seen in Table 1, the numbers of observations are different for the different vari-
ables. Data on the numbers of employees are only available from 1990 and wage data are only
available from 1993, so there are fewer observations for these variables than for population.
The house-price index is only available from 2003 and only for a subset of the municipalities.
3.1 Residency requirement in Norway
To counter the perceived negative effects of absentee ownership on peripheral regions, in 1974
the Norwegian government introduced a residency requirement for property owners. Under the
law, the owner of any property in Norway larger than a specified minimum size is required to
reside on the property a majority of the nights of the year.6 If this requirement is not fulfilled,
then the owner can be forced to sell.
Furthermore, the law allows the municipalities to choose to apply a ‘zero limit’, meaning
that the residency requirement applies to all properties in the municipality that are or have ever
been used as permanent residences. The policy is non-personal, so the owner of a property may
satisfy the requirement by renting out the property to a tenant who resides there for a majority of
the year. To keep the terminology simple, the remainder of this paper uses the term ‘residency
requirement’ to refer exclusively to the application of the zero limit.
By the end of 2016, 92 of the 428 municipalities in Norway had made the residency require-
ment law for some period of time. However, 41 of these municipalities had since removed it,
leaving 51 municipalities with the residency requirement in force on January 1st, 2017. The
data on the application of the residency requirement were obtained from the internet database
6The original 1974 law specified that the residency requirement would apply to all vacation properties of at
least 0.2 hectares and all other properties of at least 2 hectares (Government of the Kingdom of Norway, 1974).
In 2003, the minimum size of non-vacation properties was raised to 10 hectares with no more than 2.5 hectares of
cultivated land (Government of the Kingdom of Norway, 2003).
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Lovdata.
Figure 1 plots the number of municipalities that had the residency requirement in force in
each year and the aggregate population of these municipalities. The number of municipalities
with the residency requirement grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, peaked at 75 in 2005,
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Figure 1: Number of Norwegian municipalities with the residency requirement in each year from 1974
to 2016 and the aggregate population of those municipalities.
Figure 2 presents maps of the municipalities that had the residency requirement in force in
1985, 1995, 2005, and 2015. The maps show that the greatest concentration of municipalities
with the residency requirement is along the southern coast of Norway within 300 kilometres of
Oslo. There is also a tendency for municipalities in the mountainous areas in the south of the
country to have the residency requirement. Few municipalities in the north of the country, far
from the largest population centres, have the residency requirement.
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Figure 2: Maps of the Norwegian municipalities with the residency requirement in 1985, 1995, 2005,
and 2015. The municipalities with the residency requirement are shaded. Municipalities where the
residency requirement applies to only part of the municipality have a lighter shade.
Appendix A details some statistics for the municipalities that have had the residency require-
ment. The statistics on political representation allay a potential concern about the estimated
effects of the policy being due to other policies introduced by the same political parties.
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4 Model
In order to understand how a small regional economy can be affected by the demand for housing
by seasonal residents, I introduce a model of such an economy. The model represents a general
equilibrium in the local area, in which wages, goods prices, and house prices are generated as
equilibrium outcomes. To keep things simple, the housing demand from seasonal residents is
assumed to be exogenous.
The model is intended to represent a small regional economy that may have local and sea-
sonal residents. The local residents work and shop in the region but migrate away if their
standard of living would be higher elsewhere. The seasonal residents own houses but do not
consume local goods or supply labour in the local area. A single firm, located at the arbitrarily-
defined ‘centre’ of the region, employs local residents and produces a non-tradable good that is
consumed in the local area.7
Locations in the region are homogeneous except for their distance from the centre of the
region, where all production and shopping occurs. The locations are therefore characterised by
the distance r from the centre of the region.
4.1 Individuals
Local residents gain utility from consuming amount x≥ 0 of the locally-produced consumption
good and y ≥ 0 of a tradable good. The local good has price qx. The tradable good is freely
traded and serves as the numeraire, so its price is fixed at unity. The utility of each local resident
is described by the function:
u(x,y) = ln(x)+ y (1)
Local residents are all employed by the local firm and each earns wage w. To live in the local
area, each individual must secure housing at some location r, which costs p(r). Commuting to
work (and travelling to shop) from location r costs τ (r), where τ ′ > 0. In addition to the wages,
each local resident receives an exogenous annual amount I from investment income. The budget
7The assumption of an arbitrarily-defined ‘centre’ where local employment and shopping occurs is made for
simplicity. The theoretical results would apply if local employment and shopping occurred in a broad area such as
a main street or in several separate locations. All that is required is that local residents value the same locations as
seasonal residents.
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constraint of a local resident who lives at r is therefore:
w+ I ≥ p(r)+ τ (r)+qxx+ y (2)
Individuals are able to migrate freely and would obtain the prevailing level of utility ū if they
lived elsewhere. The population of local residents is therefore in equilibrium when the utility
level of each individual satisfies:
u(x,y) = ū (3)
The demand for the local good by each individual is found by maximising utility (1) given





The demand for the tradable good is simply the amount that can be purchased given (4).
Therefore, given the utility level (3):






As the labour input of each worker in the region is used by the local firm to produce one unit
of output, the amount of the local good consumed by each local resident in equilibrium must
be:
x̂ = 1 (6)
The total spending on the consumption goods in equilibrium is found by combining (4), (5),
and (6):
qxx̂+ ŷ = 1+ ū (7)
4.2 Housing market
As the utility function is strictly increasing in consumption of the two goods, the budget con-
straint must bind in equilibrium. Furthermore, the migration equilibrium requires each local
resident to have consumption levels x̂ and ŷ. The budget constraint (2) thus yields the following
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expression for the combined housing and commuting costs for an individual living at r:
p(r)+ τ (r) = w+ I−qxx̂− ŷ (8)
The seasonal residents are willing to pay ps ≥ 0 for housing in any location in the region.8
The value of ps is assumed to be determined by local amenities and factors external to the local
economy and is thus treated as a parameter, which is supported by the finding of Aanesland
and Holm (2002) that demand for housing by seasonal residents in Norway is not affected
by the local labour market. As the owners of vacation homes in Norway spend far less on
consumption in the local area than do local residents, for simplicity it is assumed in the model
that the seasonal residents do not consume the local good or participate in the local labour
market.9 The same theoretical predictions would arise under the assumption that the seasonal
residents consume a small positive amount in the local area.
Local and seasonal residents each bid what they are willing to pay for the houses at each
location r. For local residents this is the price pl (r) implied by (8) given the local wage w,
required consumption level x̂, and the commuting costs τ (r):
pl (r) = [w+ I−qxx̂− ŷ− τ (r)]+ (9)
For seasonal residents the willingness to pay is simply ps for all locations. Figure 3 plots
the house price bids of the local and seasonal residents by the distance r from the centre.
8 ps is assumed to be constant across space to keep the model simple. In reality, seasonal residents may prefer
to be near the centre of the region or some natural amenity elsewhere, in which case ps should vary by location.
However, the interpretations would largely be obvious, as seasonal residents would tend to outbid local residents
in the locations they value more.
9Total spending by Norwegian households on vacation-home trips in 2002 was 15 billion NOK (Hille, Aall and
Klepp, 2007), roughly 2% of total consumption spending. While this spending would be concentrated in certain
regions and does not include capital spending (though it does include spending on items visitors bring with them),






Figure 3: House price bids of local and seasonal residents by distance from the centre of the region.
As the price bids of the local residents (9) are decreasing in r while the price bids of the
seasonal residents are constant in r, in equilibrium the two types of resident sort by distance,
with local residents at nearer locations and seasonal residents at more distant locations. The
most distant location at which local residents live is defined to be r̄. Equilibrium house prices
are therefore:
p(r) =
 w+ I−qxx̂− ŷ− τ (r) i f r ≤ r̄ps i f r > r̄ (10)
Two simplifying assumptions are now introduced. Firstly, there is assumed to be one unit
of housing at each unit of distance from the centre, so the most distant location at which local
residents live is simply:
r̄ = n (11)
Secondly, the function for commuting costs is assumed to take the following linear form
with parameter γ > 0:
τ (r) = γr (12)
By definition, the house price bids of local residents at r̄ must equal the bids of the seasonal
residents at that location, so p̂(r̄) = ps. Thus the wage that a local resident requires to live in
the region as a function of the number of local residents may be derived from (7), (10), (11),
and (12):
w(n) = ps + γn+1+ ū− I (13)
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4.3 Production
The firm has a fixed cost of operation f ≥ 0 and produces one unit of output for each unit of
labour input. For wage w≥ 0, the cost of producing X units of output is therefore:
c(X) = f +wX (14)
The firm’s output is sold for price qx. The profit π (qx,w,X) earned by the firm is thus:
π (qx,w,X) = (qx−w)X− f (15)
As each local resident supplies one unit of labour and each unit of labour is used to produce
one unit of the local good, the equilibrium output of the firm must equal n:
X̂ = n (16)
The firm maximises its profit by setting the price, wage, and level of output that maximise
(15). From (4) and (6) the price qx must equal one for the local goods market to clear, wages are
directly related to n by (13), and the aggregate output in equilibrium X̂ is related to n by (16),
so the firm’s profit can be expressed in terms of the single decision variable n:
π (n) = (I− ps− γn− ū)n− f (17)
The firm chooses n to maximise its profits (17). If the maximum obtainable profit is negative
then the firm does not operate, so n = 0. As the profit is decreasing in ps, given the other
parameters there is some threshold level of ps below which the firm faces negative profit and
thus does not operate. This threshold is denoted p̃s and can be found by choosing n to maximise













2γ (I− ps− ū) i f ps ≤ p̃s
0 i f ps > p̃s
(19)




2 (I− ps− ū) i f ps ≤ p̃s
0 i f ps > p̃s
(20)




4γ (I− ps− ū)
2− f i f ps ≤ p̃s
0 i f ps > p̃s
(21)
4.4 Equilibrium house prices
The equilibrium house price is characterised in terms of the exogenous variables by combining




2 (I + ps− ū)− γr i f r ≤ r̄
ps i f r > r̄
(22)
Furthermore, the most distant location occupied by a local resident can be defined in terms




2γ (1− ps− x̂) i f ps ≤ p̃s
0 i f ps > p̃s
(23)
5 Effects of seasonal residents on the local economy
The house price bids of seasonal residents affect the equilibrium levels of the local house prices,
population, wages, and firm profit. This section explores these relationships in detail.
How the house price bids of seasonal residents ps affect equilibrium house prices by location
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(22) is complex, as changes in ps affect the house price bids of both local and seasonal residents,
shift the threshold distance r̄, and cause a discrete change in local economic activity if the
threshold p̃s is traversed. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium house price by distance from the
centre of the region for four selected levels of ps, which highlights two features of the model
that are important for the policy analysis. The first is the threshold level of house price bids
by seasonal residents p̃s, which in this case lies between p1s and p
2
s . The second is that an
increase in ps can lead to a decrease in the equilibrium house prices at some locations. This
is demonstrated by the equilibrium pricesp̂0(r) and p̂1(r) being higher than p̂2(r) for some










Figure 4: Equilibrium house prices by distance from the centre of the region for four levels of house
price bids by seasonal residents.
To further illustrate the relationship between the house price bids of seasonal residents and
equilibrium house prices, Figure 5 plots the relationship at location r = 0. It shows the non-
monotonic relationship between ps and equilibrium house prices, with prices increasing in ps
over the range of values where the location is inhabited by local residents, then a discrete drop
to ps at the threshold p̃s. A similar relationship applies to all other locations that are inhabited




Figure 5: Relationship between the house price bids of seasonal residents and the equilibrium house
price bids of local residents at the centre of the region.
Figure 6 plots the relationship from (19) between the house price bids of seasonal residents
and the equilibrium population of local residents. Figure 7 plots the relationships from (20) and
(21) between the house price bids of seasonal residents and the equilibrium local wages and
profits of the local firm. . Firm profit is decreasing in ps up to the threshold p̃s, as increases
in ps shrink the local market for the firm’s products and require the firm to pay higher wages
for the workers to obtain utility ū. For any level of ps above the threshold p̃s, the firm would
earn a negative profit so it does not operate. At the threshold p̃s there is a precipitous decrease




Figure 6: Relationship between the house price bids of seasonal residents and the equilibrium population
of local residents.







Figure 7: Relationships between the house price bids of seasonal residents and equilibrium local wages
and firm profit.
The decline in local population at p̃s validates the concern that seasonal housing may lead
to a hollowing-out of the local community. As the demand for locally-produced goods and
services decreases, local firms close down, which reduces the availability of local products. In
a sense, the region would be too successful in attracting seasonal residents to benefit from their
presence. It is notable that the sharp drop in the population at p̃s is not predictable from the
marginal decreases in population at lower levels of ps.
6 Effects of the residency requirement on the local economy
I now turn to the Norwegian residency requirement and ask how such a policy would affect out-
comes in the model. The residency requirement can be represented in the model by artificially
setting the house price bids of seasonal residents to zero. The outcomes can then be compared
with and without the policy, which generates predictions that are tested with the data. For
simplicity, I assume for this section that the house price bids of seasonal residents are strictly
positive, so ps > 0.
The equilibrium values of the variables with the residency requirement are differentiated
from the market equilibrium by the superscript RR. As there are no seasonal residents when the
residency requirement is in place, r̄RR simply represents the most distant location at which local
residents live. As the parameters are assumed to give rise to local production in the absence of
seasonal residents, n̂RR > 0 and therefore r̄RR > 0. The equilibrium number of local residents
18





ŵRR = 1− 1
2
(I− ū) (25)










2 (I− ū)− γr i f r ≤ r̄
RR
0 i f r > r̄RR
(27)
The effect of the residency requirement on the size of the local population is characterised
by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The residency requirement increases the equilibrium size of the local population.
Proof. Comparing n̂ with n̂RR from (19) and (24) yields n̂RR = 12γ (I− ū)> n̂ =
1
2γ (I− ps− ū)
for ps ≤ p̃s and n̂RR = 12γ (I− ū)> n̂ = 0 for ps > p̃s. The equilibrium population size is there-
fore larger when the residency requirement is in force.
The result in Proposition 1 is evident from Figure 6, which shows n̂ to be strictly decreasing
in ps for ps ≤ p̃s and then zero for all ps > p̃s. The situation in which there is a residency
requirement and thus ps = 0 is represented by the vertical axis of Figure 6.11
The effect of the residency requirement on local wages may be positive or negative, de-
pending on whether local business survives when seasonal residents can purchase housing. The
possibilities are detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The residency requirement leads to:
1. Lower local wages in equilibrium if ps ≤ p̃s;
2. Higher local wages in equilibrium if ps > p̃s.
11A trivial exception to Proposition 1 would be if the local population would be zero even in the absence of
demand from seasonal residents.
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Proof. Comparing ŵ with ŵRR from (20) and (25) yields ŵRR = 1− 12 (I− ū)< ŵ= 1−
1
2 (I− ps− ū)
for ps ≤ p̃s and ŵRR = 1− 12 (I− ū) > ŵ = 0 for ps > p̃s. The equilibrium wage is therefore
lower with the residency requirement for ps ≤ p̃s but higher with the residency requirement for
ps > p̃s.
The result in Proposition 2 can be inferred from the plot for the equilibrium wage ŵ in
Figure 7. Relative to the situation where ps = 0, the wages are higher when there are seasonal
residents if ps ≤ p̃s, but lower for any ps > p̃s.
The effect of the residency requirement on house prices is also ambiguous. For example,
in any area that would be inhabited by local residents with or without the policy, the residency
requirement leads to lower house prices as pRRl (r)=
1
2 (I− ū)−γr≤ pl (r)=
1
2 (I + ps− ū)−γr.
However, the residency requirement may lead to higher house prices in some locations if local
production only occurs with the residency requirement. The following proposition summarises
the possibilities.
Proposition 3. The residency requirement leads to:
1. Lower (or identical) house prices at location r in equilibrium if ps ≤ p̃s or pRRl (r)≤ ps;
2. Higher house prices at location r in equilibrium if pRRl (r)> ps > p̃s.
Proof. Setting pRRs = 0 in (22) yields p̂
RR (r) = max
{1
2 (I− ū)− γr,0
}
. With no residency re-
quirement, each type of resident bids more for each location r, as ps≥ 0 and pl (r)= 12 (I + ps− ū)−
γr≥ pRRl (r) =
1
2 (I− ū)−γr. Therefore, the residency requirement leads to higher house prices
at location r if and only if (1) location r is occupied by local residents if there is a residency
requirement but by seasonal residents if there is not and (2) those local residents bid more than
ps. That is, p̂RR (r)> p̂(r) iff ps > p̃s = I− ū−2
√
γ f and pRRl (r) =
1
2 (I− ū)− γr > ps.
7 Empirical analysis of the Norwegian residency requirement
In this section I test the effects of the Norwegian residency requirement using the municipality-
level data. The aim is to estimate a relationship of the following type:
ym,t− ym,t−1 = βZm,t + εm,t (28)
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The term ym,t is the log magnitude of the outcome variable, which may either be the popula-
tion, employment, wages, or house-price index. The term Zm,t is a binary variable that is equal
to one if municipality m has the residency requirement in year t and is equal to zero otherwise.
εm,t is an error term.
The relationship in (28) is estimated using an event-study approach, as described by MacKin-
lay (1997). The event-study approach operates by centring the variables around the time when
the policy change occurs, so the changes in the outcome variables around that ‘event’ can be
combined even though the ‘event’ occurs at different times in different places. Furthermore, as
the technique is based on variation in the application of the policy over time within a munici-
pality, the potential for problems from reverse causality or unobserved variables are reduced.12
A difference-in-difference estimation was also run but the results were weak and inconclusive,
so it is presented in Appendix B.
The event-study estimation equation is set up as follows. Let im be the year that the resi-
dency requirement is introduced in municipality m.13 A set of binary variables I[t=im+k] indicate
whether year t is k years before or after the introduction of the policy in municipality m, where
−5≤ k≤ 5. The binary variables are only defined for a period of five years before and after the
policy is introduced and are not defined for years after the policy is removed or for municipali-














A similar expression is estimated for the removal of the residency requirement, with rm
denoting the year that the residency requirement is removed in municipality m. The binary
variables I[t=rm+k] are defined for five years before to five years after the removal of the policy,















Table 2 presents the estimates of (29) for the changes in population, employment, wages,
12To identify the effects of the residency requirement, it would be ideal to have some quasi-experimental source
of variation in which municipalities have the residency requirement. However, there are no obvious factors that
determine the timing of the residency requirement but are not otherwise correlated with the outcome variables.
13As of January 2017, no municipality had introduced the policy, removed it, then introduced it a second time.
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and house prices relative to the year the residency requirement was introduced. The first column
uses data from 1975 – the earliest year the residency requirement could be introduced. The other
samples begin in 1994 or 2003 – the first years for which wage data and the house-price index
are available.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     House 
 Population Employment Mean wage prices 
First year of data 1975 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 2003 
I[t=i(m)−5] 0.0002 −0.0002 0.0005 0.0019 0.0123 −0.0112a −0.0044 0.0261  
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0061) (0.0105) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0192) 
I[t=i(m)−4] −0.0005 0.0005 −0.0012 0.0027 0.0032 0.0015 0.0056 0.0344c  
(0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0103) (0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0204) 
I[t=i(m)−3] 0.0001 0.0004 0.0018 0.0029 0.0203b 0.0018 0.0126 0.0249  
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0035) (0.0057) (0.0091) (0.0040) (0.0120) (0.0209) 
I[t=i(m)−2] 0.0006 0.0009 0.0024 0.0060 0.0049 0.0051 0.0178b 0.0281  
(0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0069) (0.0032) (0.0076) (0.0243) 
I[t=i(m)−1] 0.0003 0.0011 −0.0008 0.0052 0.0033 0.0034 0.0067 0.0095  
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0052) (0.0173) 
I[t=i(m)] 0.0014c 0.0026c 0.0012 0.0059 0.0039 0.0000 −0.0011 −0.0104 
  (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0064) (0.0188) 
I[t=i(m)+1] 0.0025a 0.0042a 0.0038c 0.0059 0.0159a 0.0001 0.0064 0.0471b 
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0197) 
I[t=i(m)+2] 0.0028a 0.0043a 0.0024 0.0091c 0.0022 −0.0000 0.0086b −0.0009 
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0049) (0.0073) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0348) 
I[t=i(m)+3] 0.0022b 0.0035b 0.0045c −0.0008 0.0015 −0.0017 0.0010 0.0389c 
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0220) 
I[t=i(m)+4] 0.0017c 0.0039a 0.0064a 0.0109b 0.0098b −0.0011 −0.0001 −0.0275 
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0349) 
I[t=i(m)+5] 0.0014c 0.0028b 0.0037b −0.0025 0.0017 0.0007 −0.0004 0.0130 
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0214) 
R2 0.52 0.60 0.63 0.36 0.42 0.64 0.68 0.16 
Number of 
observations 
18,404 9,844 5,992 9,844 5,992 9,844 5,992 4,592 




Table 2: Event-study estimation of the changes in the population, employment, wages, and house prices
around the year the residency requirement was introduced.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the municipalities that have instituted the residency re-
quirement were not different from other municipalities before they introduced the policy. This
can be seen from the coefficients for the years preceding the introduction of the residency re-
quirement, which are mostly not significant.
The coefficients in Table 2 for the periods after the introduction of the residency require-
ment suggest that the introduction of the policy has positive effects on the local population,
house prices, and possibly employment and wages. The coefficients for population are small in
magnitude but positive and significant for most of the years following the introduction of the
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residency requirement for each sample. Two of the coefficients for house prices are positive and
significant. Some coefficients for the other variables are significant, but as these results are not
strong they should be interpreted with caution.
Table 3 presents the estimates of the changes around the removal of the residency require-
ment from (30), using the same dependent variables and samples as in Table 2. The results
suggest that the municipalities that chose to remove the residency requirement may have had
relatively low growth in population, employment, and house prices before the policy was re-
moved. There is some evidence of negative changes in employment and house prices after the
removal of the policy, but no significant change in the population or wages.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
     House
 Population Employment Mean wage prices
First year of data 1975 1994 2003 1994 2003 1994 2003 2003 
I[t=r(m)−5] −0.0021c −0.0014 −0.0009 −0.0064 −0.0086 −0.0026 −0.0042 −0.0292 
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0229) 
I[t=r(m)−4] −0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 −0.0060 −0.0044 −0.0007 −0.0014 −0.0430c 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0062) (0.0030) (0.0046) (0.0240) 
I[t=r(m)−3] 0.0003 0.0012 0.0015 −0.0049 −0.0097 −0.0029 −0.0023 0.0078 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0063) (0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0253) 
I[t=r(m)−2] −0.0019c −0.0012 −0.0008 −0.0023 −0.0055 −0.0057b −0.0046 −0.0509c 
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0050) (0.0068) (0.0028) (0.0046) (0.0266) 
I[t=r(m)−1] −0.0033b −0.0025c −0.0020 −0.0062 −0.0107c 0.0001 −0.0000 0.0017 
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0040) (0.0064) (0.0024) (0.0046) (0.0250) 
I[t=r(m)] −0.0024b −0.0017 −0.0005 0.0001 −0.0051 0.0028 0.0014 −0.0157
  (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0061) (0.0025) (0.0044) (0.0242) 
I[t=r(m)+1] −0.0007 −0.0000 0.0004 0.0008 −0.0039 −0.0007 −0.0002 −0.0064
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0236) 
I[t=r(m)+2] 0.0002 0.0009 0.0010 −0.0100b −0.0142b −0.0005 −0.0021 −0.0568b
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0245) 
I[t=r(m)+3] 0.0029 0.0036 0.0035 0.0091 0.0054 −0.0043 −0.0037 −0.0419c
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0247) 
I[t=r(m)+4] 0.0031 0.0038 0.0040 −0.0032 −0.0058 −0.0003 −0.0007 −0.0507
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0065) (0.0035) (0.0053) (0.0458) 
I[t=r(m)+5] −0.0002 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 −0.0029 0.0001 −0.0008 −0.0231
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0037) (0.0055) (0.0337) 
R2 0.52 0.60 0.63 0.36 0.43 0.64 0.68 0.16 
Number of 
observations 
18,404 9,844 5,992 9,844 5,992 9,844 5,992 4,592 




Table 3: Event-study estimation of the changes in the population, employment, wages, and house prices
around the year the residency requirement was removed.
There are at least two possible explanations for the relative declines in local population and
employment before the removal of the residency requirement. One would be that the decrease
in population is a partial cause of the removal of the policy, as municipalities in decline remove
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the policy in the hope of attracting seasonal residents who will bring income to the region.
A second is that the housing market could be responding to the anticipated change in policy,
as seasonal residents begin buying houses as soon as the local government decides to remove
the policy, but before the change comes into effect, and displace local residents. The apparent
relative decline in local employment following the removal of the policy could be the corollary
of the increase in employment in Table 2 that follows the introduction of the policy.
Appendix C presents event-study estimates of the effect of the residency requirement on the
local population using different subsets of the municipalities. The positive effect of the policy
on the local population is found to be primarily due to its effects in coastal regions, Western
Norway, and the region around Oslo.
8 Conclusion
As the world’s population is becoming increasingly urbanised, many rural areas are experi-
encing declines in population and local economic activity. Some of these areas attract large
numbers of seasonal residents who own vacation homes that they only occupy for part of the
year. Though seasonal residents bring income to rural areas, concerns are sometimes raised that
having houses left empty for most of the year could be harmful to the local economy, as local
firms require workers and customers to maintain their operations. In response to such concerns,
several countries have introduced policies that restrict the ownership of vacation homes. Nor-
way has a particularly restrictive policy, which forbids home ownership by part-time residents
in certain regions. This paper presents a theoretical model that can be used to analyse the im-
pact of seasonal housing on rural areas and an empirical analysis of the effects of the Norwegian
policy.
The model shows how the local labour, product, and housing markets are influenced by the
use of local housing as vacation homes. The model is used to make predictions about the effects
of the Norwegian residency requirement on the local population, wages, and house prices.
The empirical analysis shows that, after the policy is introduced in a municipality, the pop-
ulation of the municipality increases relative to other municipalities and there are weak positive
effects on local employment, wages, and house prices. These results suggest that the policy
24
is somewhat effective in achieving its aims. More broadly, the results highlight potential out-
comes that should be considered by policymakers deciding whether to use vacation homes to
aid in local development.
The results presented in this paper differ from the bulk of the literature on the effects of
vacation homes, which generally finds that vacation homes have a positive overall effect on local
wages and house prices (Hoogendoorn and Visser, 2011; Wasson et al., 2013). The difference
could be explained by the fact that trips to Norwegian vacation homes do not represent the type
of ‘tourism’ that is typical elsewhere. Rather than spending money on restaurants and other
local businesses, the typical visit to a Norwegian vacation home involves free or cheap outdoor
activities and mostly home-prepared meals, which could explain a relatively small contribution
to the local economy.
Another explanation for the negative effects of vacation homes could be selection in the
municipalities that introduce the residency requirement, whereby areas that benefit strongly
from vacation homes never choose to introduce the policy, while places where vacation homes
are negative choose to have the policy. This explanation is plausible as the municipalities where
the residency requirement has been introduced include many relatively accessible places with
good amenities, including the south coast and mountainous areas within a few hours’ drive of
Oslo, but not in remote areas in the north.
The results should thus be interpreted with some caution, as the apparently positive effects
of the residency requirement may not apply to other parts of Norway or elsewhere. It is also
questionable whether such a policy would be politically feasible in other countries, as it repre-
sents a strong restriction on the rights of property owners. Nevertheless, the policy appears to
have been reasonably successful in the parts of Norway where it has been introduced.
The analysis presented here has other limitations that could represent possible extensions.
The model has two generic production sectors, but could be made more realistic by including
multiple local firms or sectors. The sectors could be of different types, for example an explicit
local retail sector, real estate sales or maintenance, or firms that export tradable products. The
model could also be extended to include local services such as post offices or transport connec-
tions, which are not well represented by the local firms in the model.
Another limitation of the model is that it is focused on the type of vacation-home ownership
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that exists in Norway. In other places, seasonal residents may spend a larger amount of money
in the local area or stay in rented accommodation. These features would require different model
assumptions and may generate new predictions. Other possible extensions would be to allow
for different lot sizes or different types of local housing.
Finally, the model presented here is only a partial equilibrium for the overall economy, as it
does not explain the allocation of people and production between regions. That would require
a more detailed model, though it could be an extension of the model presented here. To explain
regional differences in production and in the local and seasonal populations, the model should
include differences in local amenities and productivity levels in the tradition of Roback (1982).
Such a model could be used to estimate the factors for the prevalence of vacation homes by
region and the broader consequences of policies to restrict vacation homes.
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Appendix A. Characteristics of the municipalities that have in-
troduced the residency requirement
Table A1 presents statistics for geography and population density of the sets of municipalities
that did and did not have the residency requirement between 1974 and 2016. The first row shows
the means and standard deviations for all municipalities, the second row has the statistics for
the 92 municipalities that had introduced the residency requirement before January 1st, 2017,
and the third row has the statistics for the 336 municipalities that had never had the residency
requirement up to that date. The statistics in Table A1 make clear that the municipalities that
have introduced the residency requirement are on average less likely to be on the coast, at higher
elevation, nearer to Oslo, and lower in population density than those that have not introduced
the policy.
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Coastal Mean elev. Dist. From Population
  Municipalities location (metres) Oslo (km) per km2
  All (n =428) 0.647 384.7 395.2 47.3
(0.478) (305.2) (355.8) (125.5)
  Ever had residency requirement 0.576 503.1 278.4 29.9
      (n =92) (0.497) (408.7) (226.2) (54.4)
  Never had residency requirement 0.667 352.2 427.2 52.0
      (n =336) (0.472) (261.6) (377.7) (138.4)
  Note: standard deviations in parentheses; ‘coastal location’ is a binary variable that takes
      value 1 if the municipality has a section of coastline and value 0 otherwise; the distance
      from Oslo is the 'crow' distance from the centre of Oslo to the largest town or city in the
      municipality; population density is measured in 2000
Table A1: Geographical and population statistics for the sets of municipalities that did and did not have
the residency requirement between 1974 and 2016.
Table A2 presents statistics for the shares of political parties’ representatives on municipal
councils over the period from 1980 to 2016, using data from Statistics Norway. Three sets of
municipality-by-year combinations are compared: all municipalities in all years, only the mu-
nicipalities that had the residency requirement at some time between 1980 and 2016 but with
data for all years, and municipalities in the years that they introduced the residency require-
ment. If the residency requirement were more strongly favoured by certain political parties,
then there would be a concern that those parties might also favour other policies that influence
local growth. This may bias the results, as a measured effect of the introduction of the residency
requirement on local growth may in fact be due to the other policies. However, the statistics for
the representation on municipal councils suggest that this should not be a concern.
Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Centrist
Socialist Christian Conser-
  Municipalities Labour Liberal Left Democrat vative Progress Centre
  All (n =15,592) 0.336 0.045 0.049 0.084 0.165 0.061 0.163
(0.137) (0.055) (0.054) (0.079) (0.106) (0.078) (0.130)
  Ever had residency requirement 0.328 0.053 0.043 0.078 0.162 0.052 0.179
      (n =3,356) (0.142) (0.065) (0.051) (0.083) (0.110) (0.076) (0.142)
  Year residency requirement 0.345 0.047 0.037 0.086 0.162 0.038 0.178
      introduced (n=83) (0.157) (0.052) (0.051) (0.088) (0.113) (0.062) (0.135)
  Note: standard deviations in parentheses; the parties shown in the table are all those with at least 4% of the
      representatives on municipal councils over the period from 1980 to 2016
Table A2: Representation on municipal councils by political party between 1980 and 2016 in all munici-
palities, those that introduced the residency requirement, and municipalities in the year that the residency
requirement was introduced.
The statistics in Table A2 indicate that in municipalities that had the residency requirement
at some point, there was significantly higher or lower than average representation for each party.
The differences are all significant at at least the 10% level. This means that the types of munic-
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ipalities that had the residency requirement do tend to have different political representation on
average.
However, in the year when the policy is introduced, most political parties are statistically no
more likely to be on the council than in other years. The one exception is the Progress Party,
which has on average 1.4% less representation on councils when the residency requirement is
introduced, the difference being significant at 5%. This implies that, though political repre-
sentation is different on average in the municipalities that introduce the residency requirement,
the political representation is no different from the average for those municipalities in the years
they introduce the policy. As the estimation techniques in the paper use municipality fixed ef-
fects, these should capture the average differences in political representation, so the lack of any
difference from the average in the year the policy is introduced means that the results should
not be affected by the share of representatives on municipal councils.
Appendix B. Difference-in-difference estimation
The difference-in-difference estimation is run by fitting the following equation:
ym,t− ym,t−1 = βZm,t +µm +νt + εm,t (B1)
The variables ym,t and Zm,t have the same definitions as in equation (28). The term µm is a
fixed effect for municipality m, νt is a fixed effect for year t, and εm,t is an error term.
The fixed effects µm and νt control for the overall changes in the outcome variable by mu-
nicipality across all years and by year across all municipalities. As such, the coefficient β
represents the difference in the growth of the outcome variable relative to the average growth
in the municipality and national trends. However, it may be appropriate to control for regional
changes in the outcome variable, so the estimation is also run with county-by-year fixed effects
ξc,t , where c indexes the 19 counties in mainland Norway:
ym,t− ym,t−1 = βZm,t +µm +ξc,t + εm,t (B2)
The estimation of (B1) and (B2) is presented in Table B1. Columns 1 through 5 present
31
estimates for the relationship between the residency requirement being in place in a municipality
and the local population with a range of different fixed effects. Columns 6 through 8 present
the estimates for the relationships between the residency requirement and local employment,
wages, and house prices. To keep things as consistent as possible, the samples for population,
employment, and wages use the data from 1994 onwards, which is the first year that the wage
data are available.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Employ- Mean House
Population ment wage prices
  I [Residency requirement] −0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0009
c
−0.0007 −0.0009 0.0063
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0098)
  R 2 0.00 0.53 0.06 0.59 0.63 0.36 0.64 0.15
  Number of observations 9,844 9,844 9,844 9,844 9,844 9,844 9,844 4,592
  Municipality fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
  Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
  County-by-year fixed effects Y
  Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; a , b , c  denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%
Table B1: Difference-in-difference estimation of the relationships between the application of the resi-
dency requirement in a municipality and the population, employment, wages, and house prices.
The results in Table B1 do not exhibit any clear relationship between the application of
the residency requirement and the growth in the outcome variables. Municipalities with the
residency requirement have slightly higher growth in population in the specification with the
county-by-year fixed effects, but no other regression yields a significant effect.
Appendix C. Event-study results by type of municipality
This appendix analyses whether the event-study results in Tables 2 and 3 vary by region. Table
C1 repeats the estimation of (29) for the change in population around the introduction of the
residency requirement for different subsets of the municipalities in Norway. Column 1 uses
only the 277 municipalities with some section of coastline and Column 2 uses the 151 munic-
ipalities with no coastline. Columns 3 and 4 divide up the municipalities according to their
mean elevation above sea level. Columns 5 to 9 separate the sample into the five broad regions
in Norway.14
14The five regions comprise the following sets of the counties as they existed in 2016. Eastern Norway: Østfold,
Akershus, Oslo, Hedmark, Oppland, Buskerud, Vestfold, and Telemark. Southern Norway: Aust-Agder and Vest-
Agder. Western Norway: Rogaland, Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, and Møre og Romsdal. Trøndelag: Sør-
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The results in Table C1 suggest that the effect of the residency requirement varies some-
what with the characteristics or location of the municipality. The introduction of the residency
requirement has a stronger positive effect on the growth in the local population in coastal mu-
nicipalities than in non-coastal municipalities. The results in Columns 3 and 4 do not exhibit
a clear relationship between elevation and the effect of the residency requirement on the local
population, as some but not all coefficients are significant for municipalities above and below
the threshold. There is also some evidence that the population may have been growing before
the introduction of the policy for lower-lying areas.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coastal Non-coast Mean elevation (m) Eastern Southern Western Northern
location location 0-300 300+ Norway Norway Norway Trøndelag Norway
  I [t =i (m )−5] −0.0016 −0.0009 0.0002 −0.0008 −0.0003 −0.0027 −0.0010 −0.0008 0.0003
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0058) (0.0023)
  I [t =i (m )−4] −0.0022 0.0012 0.0015 −0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.0020 −0.0009 −0.0089
a
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0052) (0.0029)
  I [t =i (m )−3] −0.0032 0.0023 0.0021 −0.0007 0.0025 −0.0019 −0.0012 −0.0002 −0.0054
c
(0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0032)
  I [t =i (m )−2] 0.0001 0.0007 0.0042
a
−0.0010 0.0030 −0.0035 −0.0015 −0.0021 0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0018)
  I [t =i (m )−1] 0.0016 −0.0003 0.0025 −0.0000 0.0013 −0.0019 0.0043 −0.0046 0.0001
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0059) (0.0025)
  I [t =i (m )] 0.0024 0.0023 0.0012 0.0028 0.0058
c
−0.0026 0.0048 −0.0044 0.0036
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0048)
  I [t =i (m )+1] 0.0046
b 0.0036c 0.0028 0.0044
a 0.0070a 0.0006 0.0055
b
0.0031 −0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0061) (0.0036)





b 0.0069c 0.0043 −0.0029 0.0032
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0023)





c 0.0057b 0.0031 −0.0064 0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0075) (0.0042)
  I [t =i (m )+4] 0.0034
b 0.0048b 0.0029b 0.0040b 0.0048a 0.0051c 0.0063a −0.0004 −0.0027
(0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0019) (0.0049) (0.0043)





c 0.0067a 0.0028 −0.0020
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0059) (0.0034)
  R 2 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.49 0.66 0.57 0.61 0.54 0.45
  Number of observations 6,371 3,473 5,083 4,761 3,266 690 2,783 1,104 2,001
  Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; a , b , c  denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%; all regressions use the sample
      for 1994 to 2016
Table C1: Event-study estimation of the changes in population around the year the residency requirement
was introduced, for subsets of municipalities.
The results in Table C1 also vary by region. For Eastern Norway – the region around Oslo
and some mountainous areas to its north and west – the population clearly increases after the in-
troduction of the residency requirement. There is some evidence of effects in Southern Norway
and Western Norway, but not in Trøndelag or Northern Norway.
Trøndelag and Nord-Trøndelag. Northern Norway: Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark.
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Table C2 presents the results from the estimation of (30) for the change in population around
the time when the residency requirement is removed. The columns use the same subsets of
municipalities as in Table C1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coastal Non-coast Mean elevation (m) Eastern Southern Western Northern
location location 0-300 300+ Norway Norway Norway Trøndelag Norway
  I [t =r (m )−5] −0.0001 0.0044
c
−0.0004 0.0026 0.0027 0.0017 −0.0012 0.0094
c
−0.0014
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0021)
  I [t =r (m )−4] −0.0004 0.0029 −0.0005 0.0012 0.0014 −0.0011 −0.0026 0.0070
c
0.0018
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0031)




0.0017 0.0001 −0.0004 0.0035 0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0031)




0.0041 −0.0019 0.0024 −0.0037
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0028)
  I [t =r (m )−1] −0.0025 0.0022 −0.0046
b
0.0017 0.0002 0.0006 −0.0019 0.0031 −0.0064
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0039)
  I [t =r (m )] −0.0017 0.0000 −0.0036
a
0.0010 −0.0019 −0.0020 −0.0023 −0.0002 0.0023
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0042)
  I [t =r (m )+1] 0.0009 −0.0006 −0.0005 0.0012 −0.0019 −0.0011 −0.0017 0.0025 0.0093
b
(0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0040)
  I [t =r (m )+2] 0.0012 0.0014 −0.0012 0.0034
c
0.0004 −0.0033 −0.0000 0.0033 0.0093
b
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0046)
  I [t =r (m )+3] −0.0022 0.0013 −0.0043
a
0.0017 −0.0006 −0.0030 −0.0009 0.0028 −0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0026)




−0.0002 −0.0032 −0.0022 0.0000 0.0028 −0.0072
a
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0024)
  I [t =r (m )+5] −0.0025 0.0004 −0.0024 −0.0009 0.0000 −0.0010 −0.0026 0.0027 −0.0039
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0029)
  R 2 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.49 0.65 0.51 0.61 0.59 0.46
  Number of observations 6,371 3,473 5,083 4,761 3,266 690 2,783 1,104 2,001
  Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; a , b , c  denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%; all regressions use the sample
      for 1994 to 2016
Table C2: Event-study estimation of the changes in population around the year the residency requirement
was removed, for subsets of municipalities.
The results in Table C2 exhibit few differences by region. The removal of the policy is
associated with a subsequent decline in the population of municipalities below 300 metres in
elevation and an increase in population in Northern Norway. The coefficients for the other
categories of regions are generally not significantly different from zero.
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